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FOREWORD:
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
DOING THE RIGHT THING
Suzanna Sherry*
Fifteen years after a prominent American jurist urged a revitalization
of state constitutional law,1 a somewhat less prominent American legal
scholar announced that state constitutional law was "a vast wasteland of
'2
confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements."
In the two years since that pessimistic pronouncement, scholars have
debated with renewed fervor the appropriate role that state courts, and
state constitutions, should play in our federalist system.
My own view is that this debate is a waste of ink.
State courts, of course, are free to interpret state constitutions as
more protective of liberty than the Federal Constitution. Indeed, when
Justice Brennan first suggested that lawyers turn to state courts and state
constitutions, he did so in the context of fears that an increasingly
conservative federal judiciary would decline to protect liberty as
vigorously as in the past.
The debate has moved well beyond narrow political concerns,
however, and now focuses on whether it is accurate or advisable to
consider state constitutions as significantly different and independent
from the Federal Constitution. When faced with a claim that some
government action is unconstitutional because it invades a protected
liberty, what should state courts do?
Some advocates of the New Federalism, as it has come to be called,
would have judges look first to the state constitution and consult the
Federal Constitution only if it becomes necessary. Others, including
Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme Court, 3 adopt a more
interstitial approach, suggesting that state constitutions ought to be used
to fill in the gaps left by crabbed interpretations of federal rights. Either
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University of
Minnesota.
1. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
2. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L.
REV. 761, 763 (1992).
3. See Stewart J.Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Rights, 35 RUTGERs L. REV. 707 (1983).
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way, proponents of a vibrant state constitutionalism suggest that state
courts should look to the unique history, values, and needs of their
individual states when interpreting the state constitution.
Those who are less enthusiastic about the New Federalism, on the
other hand, question whether truly independent state court interpretation
of state constitutions has occurred, whether it is possible, and whether it
is a good idea. Whether state courts are actually engaging in independent
interpretation is a matter of counting and analyzing state decisions on
constitutional questions, and opinions differ on whether New
Federalism has been a successful venture. Whether independent state
court interpretation is possible depends largely on whether the people of
the various states are actually sufficiently different in their history and
their values to justify departing from the national consensus. Again,
opinions differ. Finally, at least one scholar makes the argument that
independent state constitutional interpretation is inadvisable because by
emphasizing more local communities, it poses a threat to our national
community. 4 Clearly, on that score, opinions really differ.
My own view is that both sides are asking the wrong question.
When we are exploring how state constitutions ought to be interpreted,
the real question is not the relationship between state courts and federal
courts, but rather how courts in general ought to approach constitutional
questions. New Federalism becomes crucial only if one's approach to
constitutional interpretation is so narrow that minor differences in text or
history matter. But if you believe, as I do, that the function of a court,
especially in constitutional cases, is to do justice, then there is no
relevant difference between state and federal constitutions or state and
federal courts. This is not to say that text and history are irrelevant,
simply that they are not dispositive. Judging is a craft, not a science; it
requires judges to weave persuasively together the text, history, culture,
morality, and consequences. Thus both state and federal judges are
engaged in a common enterprise, which some may do more or less well
at any given time. State courts can, and have, done justice by ignoring
federal interpretations of the Federal Constitution as well as by
following those interpretations. What matters most is not the
constitutional theory but the constitutional answer.
This substantive approach to the role of state courts is in fact
consistent with their history. State court independence has ebbed and
flowed in the last two centuries, often as a consequence of the
willingness or ability of the federal courts to make just decisions. In the
beginning, of course, state courts-and state constitutions-were all
there were. So state courts worked to establish justice, often by ignoring
4.

Gardner, supra note 2, at 763.
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their own written constitutions. State court judges, like most Americans
at the time, viewed the written constitution, at least those portions which
protected individual rights, as declarative; its purpose was to declare
pre-existing natural rights, which would exist and be enforced even in
the absence of written bills of rights. The United States Constitution
reflects this vision in its preamble, which notes that the Constitution is
designed to "establish justice." The New Jersey Constitution, like many
other state constitutions, provides that "[a]ll men are by nature free and
independent, and have certain natural and inalienable rights."'5
Incidentally, one might be interested to learn that one of the inalienable
rights listed in the New Jersey Constitution is the right of "pursuing and
obtaining happiness."
Thus, early state court judges frequently measured the
constitutionality of state statutes not merely against the text of the written
constitution, but also against natural law. Between 1776 and 1900, state
judges invalidated or threatened to invalidate state statutes that conflicted
with "the law of nature," 6 "natural rights,"'7 "natural justice, ' 8 "natural
right and justice," 9 "a fundamental principle of right and justice," 10 "the
principles of civil liberty and natural justice,"'11 "the dictates of moral

5. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1. The 1776 New Jersey Constitution did not contain that
provision (indeed, it contained almost no protections of individual rights), but it was
added to the next constitution, adopted in 1844. See THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

2599, 2599 (Francis N. Thorpe ed.,

1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE

CONSTITUTIONS].

6.

See, e.g., Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784), reprinted in

JULIUS GOEBEL JR., THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS

AND

393, 400, 404 (1964); Page v. Pendleton (Va. Ch. Ct. 1793), reprinted in
GEORGE WYTHE, DECISIONS OF CASES IN VIRGINIA BY THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 211,
216 n.(e) (B.B. Minor ed., 1852).
7. See, e.g., In re Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149, 151 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
8. See, e.g., Elliot's Ex'r v. Lyell, 7 Va. (3 Call) 268, 283, 285 (1802); see also
Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 493-94, 502, 505 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) ("justice");
Lemuel Shaw, Profession of the Law in the United States, 7 AM. JURIST & L. 56, 68 (1932)
(reprinting 1827 speech by Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, referring to
"natural justice").
9. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103, 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822), rev'd
on other grounds, 20 Johns. 735 (N.Y. 1823); see also Dunn v. City Council, 16 S.C.L.
(Harp.) 189, 200 (1824) ("immutable principles of justice and common law").
10. See, e.g., Regents v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 408 (Md. 1838).
11. See, e.g., Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 405 (1814); City of Janesville v.
Carpenter, 46 N.W. 128, 132 (Wis. 1890).
COMMENTARY
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justice," 12 "common right [and] reason," 13 "principles of reason,
justice, and moral rectitude," 14 and the "inherent and inalienable rights
15
of human nature."
Early state courts did not confine their pursuit of justice to
constitutional cases. In civil and criminal cases, most state courts
followed the English tradition and the common law in the absence of
statutory guidance. But state judges also looked to Roman and
Continental civil law, especially where they believed that the commonlaw answer was incompatible with justice. 16 New Jersey Supreme
Court Justice William Rossell explained that the civil law was a useful
supplement to the common law because it was "founded on the broad
17
basis of immutable reason and justice."
Historically, then, state court judges have seen their role as
implementing the principles of a just society. Thus, whether a state court
should follow federal constitutional principles or instead consult its own
constitution varies with the justice or injustice of federal interpretation.
And indeed, throughout our history, courageous state court judges have
sometimes stepped into the breach when the federal courts were
unwilling or unable to do justice. This essay will explore four examples
of state independence, two historical and two more modem.
As is well-known and documented, the United States Supreme
Court has a rather sorry history in dealing with the problem of slavery.
The Federal Constitution obviously contemplated that slavery would
continue to exist in at least some states, so the Court never confronted a
claim that slavery was unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the Court decided
a number of important cases involving slavery, and the unfortunate
consequence of those decisions was to limit the power of state and
federal legislatures to curtail slavery. In 1842, in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,18 the Court made it nearly impossible for northern free
states to protect blacks--even free blacks-within their borders from
southern slavecatchers. Fifteen years later, the Court became even more
12. See, e.g., Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va. (6 Call) 113, 150 (1804).
13. See, e.g., Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 98 (1789).
14. See, e.g., Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 391, 421-22 (1818).
15. Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 3, 16 (1857) (Burnett, J., concurring); see also Foster v.
Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245, 270 (1819) ("the rights of the subject"). For further
exploration of the role of natural law in state constitutional adjudication, see Suzanna
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987); Suzanna
Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171 (1992); John Choon Yoo, Our
Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967 (1993).
16. See R.H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American
Jurisprudence,66 TUL. L. REV. 1649 (1992).
17. Den v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 197, 203 (1807).
18. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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complicit in the institution of slavery when it held, in Dred Scott v.
Sandford,19 that Congress itself had no power to abolish slavery in the
territories.
Some state constitutions, however, were more protective of liberty.
The Vermont Constitution explicitly outlawed slavery. 20 The
Massachusetts Constitution simply declared that "all men are born
of cases in the early 1780s
equally free and independent," and a series 21
interpreted this provision to abolish slavery.
Even when it came to the difficult questions of the relationships
between free and slave states, the state constitutions were often more
generous than the Federal Constitution. In Prigg, the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a Pennsylvania kidnapping law because it
made it too difficult for slavecatchers to remove fugitive slaves. In
1836, the highest court of New Jersey invalidated a law almost identical
to Pennsylvania's law on the ground that it made it too easy for
slavecatchers. 22 The New Jersey court essentially held that a black
claiming to be free was constitutionally entitled to a full jury trial in New
Jersey to determine whether he was free or slave before he could be
removed from the state as a fugitive slave. Similarly, although the
United States Supreme Court avoided the question in Dred Scott, state
courts were frequently faced with the question of what should happen to
a slave who was taken to a free state-did he thereby become free?
Between 1830 and 1860, courts in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and
New York each held that a slave brought into their respective states
became free. 2 3 In the New York case, the slaveowners were in New

York only to change ships, as there was no direct sea passage between
their native Virginia and their new home in the slave state of Texas.
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals freed the eight slaves
19. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
20. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, art. I, reprinted in FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
at 3749, 3751. Vermont's 1777 Constitution, which failed when Vermont's first attempt
to become an independent state failed, contained an identical provision. Id. at 3739.
21. Quock Walker Cases (unreported); see WILLIAM WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF
ANTISLAVERY CONSTruTIONALISM IN AMERICAN, 1760-1848, at 45-48 (1977).
22. State v. Sheriff of Burlington (N.J. 1836). The case is unreported but is described
and analyzed in detail in Paul Finkelman, State ConstitutionalProtections of Liberty and
the Antebellum New Jersey Supreme Court: Chief Justice Hornblower and the Fugitive
Slave Law, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 753 (1992). The best report of the case in existence was
published in the New York Evening Post on August 1, 1851. This report has been
reprinted as Opinion of Chief Justice Hornblower on the Fugitive Slave Law in Series II, 1
SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988). Id. at 754
n.8.
23. Jackson v. Bulloch, 12 Conn. 38 (1837); Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 193 (1836); Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
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they had brought with them on the journey. 2 4 The courts of all three free
states relied on the doctrine that slavery is against natural law, and can
therefore exist only where it is sanctioned by positive law. Thus, natural
law in some states and both natural and positive law in others operated
25
to free any person brought into the state in bondage.
Less well-known even than the history of slavery in the state courts
is the history of school integration in the state courts. Although in 1849
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to declare
segregated schools invalid under the Massachusetts Constitution, 26 later
in the century, other state courts were more enlightened. On April 14,
1868, two months before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the
Supreme Court of Iowa struck down segregated schools as a violation
of the Iowa Constitution. 2 7 In keeping with the natural law traditions of
state courts, the Iowa court based its decision not only on that part of the
written constitution which provided "[t]he board of education shall
provide for the education of all the youths of the State,"2 8 but also on
"the principle of equal rights to all, upon which our government was
'3 0
founded," 2 9 and "the spirit of our laws."
Iowa was not alone. In 1881, seventy-three years before the United
States Supreme Court struck down Topeka's segregated schools in
Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court of Kansas prohibited
31
a different Kansas school board from maintaining segregated schools.
Justice Valentine's stirring rejection of segregation is startlingly similar
to Chief Justice Warren's later reminder that education is the foundation
of citizenship. Valentine declared for his court:

24. Although the Massachusetts and Connecticut cases involved somewhat longer
sojourns in the state, all of the slaveowners intended to return to their homes in states
which permitted slavery.
25. Both cases rested in part on Somerset v. Stewart, Loft 98 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B.
1772) 20 Howell St. Tr. (G.B.) 1 (1772). For a thorough discussion of the American
implications of Somerset, see PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY,
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981).

26. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
27. Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868).
28. IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. 9, § 12, quoted in Clark, 24 Iowa at 271 (emphasis
added).
29. Clark, 24 Iowa at 269.
30. Id. at 276.
31. Board of Educ. v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 (1881). The court ruled that the municipal
attempts at segregation violated state statutory authority, rather than the state
constitution, but the language is unusually broad for a purely statutory case. For example,
the court suggested that "[n]o good reason" could be given for segregated schools. Id. at
21.
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[P]ersons by isolation may become strangers even in their own country; and
by being strangers, will be of but little benefit either to themselves or to
society. As a rule, people cannot afford to be ignorant of the society which
surrounds them; and as all kinds of people must live together in the same
32
society, it would seem better that all should be taught in the same schools.

Unfortunately, the Kansas Supreme Court changed its views two
decades later, upholding segregated schools in 190333 and ultimately
leaving to the United States Supreme Court the task of desegregating
public schools in Kansas.
Turning now from the dusty pages of nineteenth-century law reports
to today's national developments about abortion and gay rights, state
courts have also been in the forefront of both issues. In 1969, four
years before the United States Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, the
Supreme Court of California invalidated a law prohibiting abortions,
finding the statute in violation of both the federal and state
constitutions. 34 The court did not cite particular provisions of either
constitution, noting instead that the absence of an enumerated right of
'35
privacy "is no impediment to the existence of the right."
The California Constitution may have been a useful tool for doing
justice in the abortion context, but, as with slavery and school
segregation, it was ultimately unnecessary. The Federal Constitution
was eventually interpreted to protect the same rights that the state
constitution did. In some contexts, however, the state constitution
remains the only bulwark against injustice.
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court held that state and federal
governments could legitimately refuse to pay for abortions for indigent
women, even if the government paid the substantially greater cost of
childbirth. 36 They reaffirmed that holding three years later-permitting
the government to eliminate funding even for abortions necessary to the
woman's health-and have not wavered since. 3 7 The Federal
Constitution thus protects the right to obtain an abortion, but only for
women who can afford one.
The New Jersey Constitution, on the other hand, protects a
somewhat broader right. In 1982, Justice Pollock held that the "natural
and inalienable rights" provision of the New Jersey Constitution
prohibited the government from simultaneously funding childbirth and
32. Id. at 19.
33. Reynolds v. Board of Educ., 72 P. 274 (Kan. 1903).

34.
35.
36.
37.

People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969).
Id. at 200.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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denying funding for medically necessary abortions. 38 In that case, the
New Jersey court rejected not only the specific holdings of the earlier
United States Supreme Court cases, but also questioned the latter's
narrow approach to equal protection law. Justice Pollock noted that "the
conflicting individual and governmental interests do not easily fit into
39
[the] rigid analytical structure" of two-tiered equal protection analysis.
Instead, "'a court must weigh the nature of the restraint or denial against
the apparent public justification, and decide whether the State action is
arbitrary."' 40 While Justice Pollock's modern language is not as
mellifluous as the natural rights rhetoric of the older cases, it reflects the
same inclination to pursue fairness and justice.
Finally, state courts are interpreting state constitutions to provide to
gays and lesbians the protections denied them by the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick, which held that
Georgia could criminalize homosexual sodomy. Using stirring natural
law rhetoric, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently invalidated a
Kentucky law prohibiting "deviate sexual intercourse with another of the
same sex." 4 1 The court relied on such sources as John Stuart Mill's On
Liberty to hold that "it is not within the competency of the government
to invade the privacy of a citizen's life and to regulate his conduct in
matters in which he alone is concerned. ' 42 Thus, according to Justice
Leibson's majority opinion, "[i]n Kentucky [Equal Justice Under Law]
is more than a mere aspiration. It is part of the 'inherent and inalienable'
rights protected by our Kentucky Constitution." 4 3 Justice Combs
declared in a concurring opinion that "[t]he [Kentucky] Constitution
does not create any rights of, or grant any rights to, the people. It
merely recognizes their primordial rights, and constructs a government
as a means of protecting and preserving them." 44 Other states have also

38. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982). Other state courts
have reached similar conclusions. See Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1986); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Hope v.
Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1993),
rev'd, 634 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1994).
39. Byrne, 91 N.J. at 308, 450 A.2d at 936.
40. Id. at 309, 450 A.2d at 936 (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 492, 303
A.2d 273, 282, cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973)).
41. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (quoting KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 510.100 (Baldwin 1992)).
42. Id. at 494 (quoting Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 385 (Ky.
1909)).
43. Id. at 501.
44. Id. at 502 (Combs, J., concurring).
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invalidated penalties against homosexual conduct, 45 and the Hawaii
Supreme Court has recently declared that the ban on homosexual
marriage will be struck down unless the state can show a compelling
reason for it.4 6
In these cases, state courts used state constitutions to achieve ends
that the Federal Constitution at the time did not, and much of their
rhetoric suggests that their goal was to further the cause of justice. I
suspect that not everyone will agree with my assessment that all of these
cases were decided justly. Indeed, I am confident that while everyone
will agree that state courts acted righteously and courageously in
abolishing slavery and striking down segregated schools, there will be
more controversy over the decisions involving abortion and
homosexuality. But the lack of controversy over slavery and integration
is a reflection of our current sensibilities, and the result of decades of
national debate over those very issues. Indeed, both issues were
originally so controversial that they could not be resolved without the
use of federal troops. What I suggest is that when we evaluate cases like
the abortion and gay rights cases, we should engage in that same kind of
substantive debate, although I hope that federal troops will not be
necessary this time.
We who have come of age during the Warren Court era-and now
our students, on whom we are visiting our ahistorical prejudices-have
a distorted view of the relationship between state and federal courts.
Because the federal courts were so vigorous (some might say overly
vigorous) in protecting liberty during the Warren Court era, there was
little left for state courts to do. Two decades-virtually a generation-of
federal dominance has now led us almost to forget that state courts can
also protect liberty. When, in the wake of a federal abandonment of the
goal of doing justice (a withdrawal that was justified in terms of judicial
restraint and strict constructionism), we rediscovered state courts, we
had apparently forgotten the natural law heritage they once shared with
the federal courts.
The debate over state courts has been mistakenly focused on the
implications of their status as state courts rather than on the role of state
courts. We have substituted a sterile argument over the arcana of
federalism for a robust debate over the meaning of our fundamental
constitutional principles. If the Kentucky Constitution affords more
protection to gays and lesbians or the New Jersey Constitution requires
more public funding of abortion than the Federal Constitution does, I
45. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio,
415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
46. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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would rather discuss which rule is more just-and, by implication,
which ought to be adopted by other jurisdictions-than whether it is
possible or desirable for state courts to engage in truly independent
constitutional review. Wouldn't you?
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